



Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Mack, Michael (2014) 'Philosophy and literature in times of crisis : challenging our infatuation with numbers.',
London: Bloomsbury .




Sample chapter deposited. Chapter 4: 'A Disenchantment with Numbers: Philosophy and Literature'. Erudite and
incisive, Michael Mack crucially poises literary and philosophical events and contestations. The book explores rhetorical
as well as conceptual operations capable of taking out some of our abidingand culturally perniciousattachment
disorders.  Avital Ronell, University Professor of the Humanities, and Professor of Comparative Literature and
German, New York University, USA Philosophy and Literature in Times of Crisis is a stunningly brilliant analysis of
our increasingly digitalized culture that celebrates the quantiﬁable conceptions of the good life. Drawing upon a
polymathic erudition, Mack challenges the regnant epistemological and disciplinary dichotomies that sustain an
opposition between subjectivity and objectivity, which, in turn, sponsor fetishistic adoration of the scientiﬁc and
economic paradigms that has led to the eclipse of the ethical as the ultimate arbiter of a life worth living.  Paul
Mendes-Flohr, Professor of Modern Jewish Thought, the Divinity School, University of Chicago, USA, and Professor
Emeritus of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel.
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
Chapter 4) 
A Disenchantment with Numbers: Philosophy and Literature. 
To treat their [confessional poets] poems mainly as documents of personal experience is not 
just to diminish their achievement, but to ignore their unanimous disdain for the idea of 
confessional poetry.  
Adam Kirsch, The Wounded Surgeon. 
So even as governmental tactics give rise to this sovereignty, sovereignty comes to operate on 
the very field of governmentality: the management of populations. Finally, it seems important 
to recognize that one way of ‘“managing”’ a population is to constitute them as less than 
human without entitlement to rights, as the humanly unrecognizable.  
Judith Butler, Precarious Life. 
1. Agamben’s and Foucault’s critique of political theology 
As we have seen in the previous chapter the ethics of literature uncovers the partiality of the 
purported impartiality (or non-subjectivity) of publically acclaimed truths. Public 
representations of justice and law, of what is human or non-human, and associated with these, 
of what is normal or abnormal, healthy or pathological, innocent or guilty, harmless or 
accused, may be false or fictitious. Yet these representations, once they have governmentally 
and socially been approved, come to precondition our understanding of what is ethically 
acceptable. The way we represent the world may be subjective. The subjective turns 
substantive, however, once it has received public or governmental approval as well as 
acclamation. Acclamation marks the point where politics and modern media meet theology. 
What kind of theology? A theology that appraises, that glorifies either transcendent 
(God or gods) or secular power (the sovereign, the ruling party and so forth, the ruling class 
of managerial power and so forth).<xfn>1</xfn>It is a theology of glory which that 
constitutes, as Giorgio Agamben has recently put it, ‘“the secret point of contact through 
which theology and politics continuously communicate and exchange parts with one 
another”’.<xfn>2</xfn>Agamben argues that modernity does not constitute a rupture with the 
theology of pre-modernity, but that it merely displaces the theological imprint of power from 
a Trinitarian sacred location to a secular and immanent one of management, the economy and 
(secular) politics— – issues with which the Butler quote is concerned at the opening of this 
chapter: ‘“Modernity, removing God from the world, has not only failed to leave theology 
behind, but in some ways has done nothing other than to lead the project of the providential 
oikonomia to completion.”’<xfn>3</xfn>Here Agamben clearly positions himself within the 
famous debate about the secular between Hans Blumenberg and Carl Schmitt. Blumenberg 
defends the legitimacy of modernity against Schmitt’s political theology, which proclaims 
that all secular terms are but translations of theological ideas. Agamben is, however, not a 
follower of Schmitt. Here it is worth noting that Agamben speaks of modernity’s failure to 
leave theology behind. According to Schmitt this is not a failure but a triumph. Similar to 
Walter Benjamin’s approach in the twenties of the past century1920s, Agamben engages with 
the conservative political theology of Schmitt (and also that of Erik Peterson) not in order to 
affirm the repetition of theological patterns within modernity but to hold modernity to 
account for precisely such repetition. 
In what ways does Agamben’s critique of theology’s persistence within secular 
practices of politics and economics pertain to the development of a new ethics borne out of 
the sources of literature? Strikingly modern literature often alludes to as well as works 
through theological themes and images. Kafka has done so and also as has one of the most 
important twentieth-century poets: Sylvia Plath. A recent study has a chapter dedicated to 
‘“Plath’s Theology”’.<xfn>4</xfn> Does Plath have a theology? Or rather, does her work 
struggle with the theological structure— – albeit emptied out of transcendent content— – of 
the world we are facing within modernity? Agamben makes a strong case that our 
predilection for what achieves the greatest number of sales or the greatest number of clicks or 
views (, the Iinternet or Ttelevision and media— – internet channels like YouTube for 
instance— – in general) or the greatest number of approval/acclamation ratings is not as 
secular or immanent as it seems but rather instantiates the displacement of theological 
hierarchies onto a different location: 
As should be evident today, people-nation and people-communication, despite the 
differences in behaviour and figure, are the two faces of doxa that, as such, ceaselessly 
interweave and separate themselves in contemporary society. In this interlacing of 
elements, the ‘“democratic”’ and secular theorists of communicative action risk finding 
themselves side by side with conservative thinkers of acclamation such as Schmitt and 
Peterson: but this is precisely the price that must be paid each time by theoretical 
elaborations that think they can do without archaeological precautions. That 
‘“government by consent”’ and the social communication on which, in the last instance, 
consensus rests, in reality harks back to acclamations is what can be shown even through 
a summary genealogical quest.<xfn>5</xfn> 
Agamben here analyses the delusions of progressive thinkers such as Habermas, which 
consist in establishing consensus as a liberal rather than conservative strategy. The delusion 
in question derives from the ignorance of the ways in which history repeats itself in different 
disguises. Agamben refers to Foucault’s method of inquiry when he evokes terms like 
‘“genealogical quest”’ and ‘“archaeology”’. 
The invocation of Foucault is significant, because it was Foucault he who has shown 
that concern for population growth and, associated with it, the marketability of huge 
quantities of goods becomes the measure of what matters and what not from the eighteenth-
century onwards. According to Foucault, from the eighteenth century onwards those who 
achieve the greatest number of sales or popular approval measures (such as fame or electoral 
success) become arbiters of both power and truth (rather than philosophical or theological 
notions of metaphysical accuracy, as was the case during the scholasticism of the Middle 
Ages). 
Pace, Foucault and Agamben argue sthat such modern strategies of public approval, 
marketability and public consensus are not something new but rather a displacement of 
Church theology which that glorifies as God’s representatives those who govern through 
public displays of acclamation. According to Agamben, within medieval theology there is 
already a clear point of coincidence where politics, economics and theology have become 
indistinct. Ernst Kantorowicz’s famous The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval 
Political Theology substantiates Agamben’s argument about the blurring of the distinction 
between the economic, the theological and the political within traditional Church thinking: 
the King represents at once the otherworldly and the worldly and this simultaneity makes 
mundane issues such as people, management, and popular (quantitative, or, in other words, 
what is based on the greatest number of people) acclamation indistinct from theological 
doxa.<xfn>6</xfn> 
Agamben’s concern is with the dark aspect of theology: a region where it has become 
indistinct from oppressive political and economic management. While employing Foucault’s 
archaeological methodology, Agamben nevertheless begs to differ when it comes to the 
question of modernity’s break with what preceded it. His genealogy of modernity diverges 
from that given by Foucault. For Agamben the origin of modern economics and politics is 
ironically non-modern, early Christian and Medieval, whereas for Foucault— – here sharing 
the progressive thinking of Blumenberg and Habermas— – it is the break with pre-modernity. 
I think both versions of modernity’s origin help explain how and why we live the way we live 
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today. Genealogical inquiry is a method Foucault has inherited from Nietzsche. As Judith 
Butler has recently argued, it is a methodology that allows for a plurality of truths:  
“Indeed, it may be that to have an origin means precisely to have several possible 
versions of the origin— – I take it that this is part of what Nietzsche meant by the 
operation of genealogy. Any one of those is a possible narrative, but of no single one can 
I say with certainty that it alone is true.”<xfn>7</xfn> 
Once we are able to read Foucault’s and Agamben’s respective accounts as partial truths 
which that complement each other, we grasp that modernity is paradoxically both a break 
with and a continuation of pre-modern thought, myth and social practice. What for Foucault 
is a non-theological modern fabrication of markets and other quantitative measures, Agamben 
sees as being part of a genealogy which that connects the premodern pre-modern with the 
modern. The doxa of purported pre-modernity already delineated as well as supported the 
activity of secular economics and politics. 
Qualifying Agamben’s argument by complementing it with Foucault’s, we could say 
that modernity intensifies within an imminent and immanent realm the operations of power 
and oppression, which in pre-modernity were shared and somewhat postponed (far off in 
another supernatural context) between this world and the world to come (a transcendent 
realm). The way power and oppression work, remains, however, the same. Its operations are 
premised on acclamation, on the will of the majority, on the power of the sheer quantity of 
those who acclaim the ruler. 
What characterizes the working of oppressive power? The simultaneity of the 
quantitative and the uniform (conforming to the rule laid out by the ruling party) reinforces 
the impression that the operations of oppressive power depend on homogeneity. According to 
the OED the first English usage of the term ‘homogeneity’ (N. Carpenter 1625) denotes both 
harmony and communion. The ruler who has the power to oppress certain groups of people 
has a harmonious relationship of acclamation with the majority of the people who uphold his 
rule. The sovereign’s subjectivity assumes the objectivity and substantiality of the population 
as a whole. The ruler thus has two bodies: representing both God and the people as a 
homogenous unity. Law, justice and the ethics associated with the legal system serve to enact 
and reinforce ‘the one size fits all’ motto which that characterizes homogeneity. Public 
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images of law and justice have the horrific function to facilitate of facilitating not only 
acceptance but also acclamation of forms of activity which that have been instituted by 
managerial authority. Through the public approval of homogenous rule, subjectivity becomes 
at one with substantiality. Let me unpack this dense argument. The ruling party which that 
makes its rule uniform and homogenously applicable in actual fact represents its partiality or 
subjectivity as if it were universal and substantive. The representation of the partial as the 
universal, of the subjective as the substantive is precisely what takes place in displays of 
public approval, or, as Agamben puts it, acclamation. 
When it comes to the interruption of homogeneity literature plays a crucial role, 
precisely because literature foregrounds the subjective against the background of its public 
representation where it appears under the disguise of substantiality. By unmasking the 
deceptive display of substantiality (during the acclamation of a ruler or during the public 
marketing of a political or economic idea or procedure), literature performs a form of 
heuristic or detective work. It does so by delineating how the purported substantiality of an 
ideology or an economic system or of a medical assessment is an in actual fact a fantasy 
which that grows out of the longing for a world in which we all cohere and are identical tools 
for a greater teleological or providential good. The ethics of literature disrupts the 
governmental blurring of the subjective and the substantive. In other words, literature’s 
insistence on subjectivity is not a subjective but a public matter: it counters the one-size fits 
all approach in public policies by articulating the infinite variety of subjective voices which 
that do not fit into the homogenous call of the ruling discourse. 
2. Sylvia Plath and the disruption of ‘confessional poetry’. 
For a critique of homogeneity, Sylvia Plath’s work is highly relevant because it foregrounds 
subjectivity. This is why it is purported to be ‘“confessional poetry”’. Her poetry has 
frequently been accused of being excessively subjective— – subjective to the point of being 
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egotistic. In this way the poet (and one of Sylvia Plath’s numerous biographers) Anne 
Stevenson demotes the intensity of Plath’s poetry as ‘“egoistic fantasizing”’ and refers to 
‘“her gift for romantic self-aggrandizing”’.<xfn>8</xfn> The main title of Stevenson’s 
biography Bitter Fame is quite ambiguous and the ambiguity derives from a highly 
moralizing assessment of Plath’s work from the perspective of her life and personality shaped 
as it was by so called so-called ‘madness’ or ‘mental illness’: ‘“She was indeed cursed. 
Desperately she struggled in the bonds of selfhood; through her writing she must find a way 
out!”’<xfn>9</xfn> Too bad, then, when her poetry does not seem to find a way out of 
subjectivity, of selfhood. 
Critics have recently discovered a more public aspect to Plath’s and confessional 
poetry in general. As Deborah Nelson has put it: 
At the time of their emergence, the confessional poets were taken to be an extreme 
instance of romantic self-absorption. However, their significance in literary history and 
to the changing culture in privacy lies in their exposure of limitations on lyric autonomy 
and constitutional sovereignty that we had not perceived the lyric subject or the 
constitutional citizen to suffer.<xfn>10</xfn> 
As we shall see, in her poetry Plath strenuously and unceasingly strengthens her selfhood. 
This act of strengthening selfhood highlights the precarious existence of the individual or 
constitutional citizen. The poetic voice touts subjectivity precisely because lyric autonomy 
and the individual difference of constitutional citizen are threatened by the homogenous 
forces of society. 
As Michael W. Clune has recently argued apropos a reading of her only novel The 
Bell Jar, Plath withdraws from intersubjective recognition (and in doing so joins the 
antipsychiatry movement of P. D. Laing and Gregory Bateson)<xfn>11</xfn>— – from what 
constitutes our sociality in social thought from Hegel via Lacan to Martha Nussbaum, Gayatri 
Spivak and Charles Taylor: ‘“Plath’s understanding of the separability of subjectivity from 
recognition underlies a dimension of her work that has remained invisible to the 
critics.”’<xfn>12</xfn> By separating cognition from social recognition Plath emphasizes her 
difference— – her deviation from societal rules, roles and regulations. According to Plath the 
social ‘“dialectic of recognition is evil”’,<xfn>13</xfn> because it paves the way for the 
totalitarian equation of one particular subject or idea with substance, with the totality of all 
there is in an actually diverse world. Clune discusses the asocial aspect of Plath’s work. This 
is an important and potentially innovative approach but Clune may highlight Plath’s hostility 
to intersubjective recognition while not considering the reasons for her poetic withdrawal 
from society. 
Most importantly the reason d’être behind Plath’s vacating the sphere of the social is 
itself socio-political: it constitutes an affront to the politics of homogeneity. As has been 
intimated above, her insistence on the individual difference of her poetic voice has provoked 
outrage in the public sphere. Far from finding a way out of her selfhood, Plath’s poetry 
creates and also preserves the life of subjectivity that refuses to meet moralistic rules and 
standards which that a biographer á la Stevenson imposes upon not only her life but also on 
her literary work. Crucially, this refusal to budge and stifle the idiosyncrasy of selfhood 
constitutes a public act. It is indeed the scandal of Plath’s poetry. 
Some of Plath’s most notorious poems— – most famously ‘Daddy’— – ostensibly do 
not achieve a transcendence of selfhood as demanded by Stevenson and others. While 
introducing her poem for a reading on the BBC, Plath highlights the idiosyncratic and 
subjective ground of the poetic voice:  
“Here the poem is spoken by a girl with an Electra complex. Her father died while she 
thought he was God. Her case is complicated by the fact that her father was a Nazi and 
her mother possibly part Jewish. In the daughter or in her imagination, the two strains 
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marry and paralyse each other— – she has to act out the awful little allegory once over 
before she is free of it.”<xfn>14</xfn> 
As Tim Kendall has noted this description of the poem emphasizes a critical or almost 
clinical distance: ‘“having been portrayed as the passive victim of a disordered psyche, Plath 
now becomes a manipulator, using her wide and detailed knowledge of psychoanalytical 
literature to mould her persona, rather too blatantly, according to pre-existing Freudian 
models”’.<xfn>15</xfn> Plath’s persona is certainly not autobiographical. Her mother was 
not Jewish and her father was not a Nazi. The poem is not confessional in the sense of 
autobiographical. 
The poem vibrates in the tension between distance and closeness, between the 
histrionic and the sincere, between the factual and the imagined, between the deftly 
calculated and the rawness of experience. George Steiner has appraised the poetic acumen 
and emotive force of ‘Daddy’ in terms worth quoting: 
In ‘Daddy’ she wrote one of the very few poems I know of in any language to come near 
the last horror. It achieves the classic act of generalization, translating a private, 
obviously intolerable hurt into a code of plain statement, of instantaneously public 
images which concern us all. It is the ‘Guernica’ of modern poetry. And it is both 
histrionic and, in some ways ‘arty’, as is Picasso’s outcry.<xfn>16</xfn> 
Steiner here describes how supposedly private or subjective experience comes to turn public, 
how via poetic rationale it ‘concerns us all’. The poem voices an imagined subjectivity, 
which becomes overwhelmed by substantive reality. Subjectivity here is passive, that of 
victimhood. The oppression of the outside reality, of substance, of all there is, goes under the 
name of father. 
The starting point is subjectivity that is being crushed by a force which that is taken to 
be that of all there is: the universe, the world, in short, God. Plath’s use of the word 
‘“complicated”’ evidences her detached position. For what does it mean that God here is a 
Nazi, a Panzermann? God as Nazi is a travesty of traditional notions of a benevolent deity. 
The way Plath reads the poem emphasizes this ridiculous aspect. The poem’s tone is infantile 
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and absurd. Take its title, which is quite childish: ‘Daddy’. Kendall has astutely drawn 
attention to the interrelation between vowel repetition— – the silly messiness that jumbles 
together shoe and Jew— – and the Freudian context which that Plath’s poem re-enacts as 
well as parodies: 
This repetitive pattern of disappearance and return represents Plath’s version of the fort-
da game as famously described in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, where the child’s 
repeated and long drawn out ‘“o-o-o-o”’ is only a slight vowel modulation away from 
the ‘oo’ repitions of ‘Daddy’. The father-figure is a ‘contemporary experience’, not a 
memory; and, as Freud explains, the reason for his continuing presence lies in the 
speaker’s ‘infantile sexual life’. The father’s early death ensures that she cannot 
progress, and her sense of selfhood is stutteringly confined within a compulsion to 
repeat.<xfn>17</xfn> 
The persona of the poem had to kill her father or god figure before in order to avoid having 
her subjectivity crushed by him. At the opening of the second stanza the voice admits this 
compulsion for a liberating kill: 
Daddy, I have had to kill you. 
The penultimate stanza doubles this act of murder before closing in the hard- to- believe 
closure of ‘I am through’: 
If I’ve killed one man, I’ve killed two— –  
The vampire who said he was you 
And drunk my blood for a year, 
Seven years, if you want to know. 
Daddy, you can lie back now. 
There’s a stake in your fat black heart 
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And the villagers never liked you. 
They are dancing and stamping on you. 
They always knew it was you. 
Daddy, daddy, you bastard, I am through.<xfn>18</xfn> 
The two acts of murdering the father figure hark back to Freud’s primal scene where the 
angry and jealous sons kill their father who has had a monopoly on sexual intercourse and 
procreation. According to Freud, the Jews repeat the primal scene by killing their 
overbearing, monopolizing and rather strict as well as homogenous leader: Moses. 
Patricide gives not only rise to a feeling of guilt. More importantly, it makes possible 
a break from sovereign power, which prevents the flourishing of diverse forms of life. Plath’s 
poem in a tongue-in-cheek tone performs the liberation of a subjective voice from the 
oppressive subject of the father. The subject of the father, at least in the eyes of the daughter, 
denies his own limited subjectivity: he was God, the substance of all there is. The poem bores 
holes into such pretentions. Admittedly it does so in a scandalous and offensive way. It 
attaches the category of Nazi to overbearing and homogeniszing authority figures and equates 
victims of such regime with victims of the Nazi genocide. There is, however, a so far not 
detected undetected connection between Plath’s juxtaposition of the silly, the thoughtless, the 
banal and the extraordinary criminality of the Holocaust. As Berel Lang has shown this 
tension between banal or ordinary violence and the unprecedented systematic as well as 
industrialized planning of the Nazi genocide has in different but related ways informed 
Jewish thought in the post-Holocaust period: 
The ‘YetzerHa’rah’ introduced in Genesis had the function of asserting the lure of evil 
(not necessarily its triumph, but its presence) even in the presence of understanding and 
thinking, which would always be options. The problem for this juxtaposition, we saw, 
concerned the imposed resolution of theodicy— – that whatever happens in history, up 
to and including the Holocaust, was ultimately the best, with God and man in some 
sense collaborative agents. Arendt would certainly reject this verdict on history— – on 
world history, on Jewish history, and on Eichmann’s history. But the terms that she 
herself sets for the problem of Holocaust-evil by insisting at once on its banality and its 
extraordinary criminality afford her no ready way of reconciling the two sides of that 
tension. She is, of course, not alone in facing this difficulty, and no doubt Jewish 
thought in the post Holocaust will continue to wrestle with it.<xfn>19</xfn> 
The complexity of ‘“Daddy’s”’ poetic voice may do justice to complex, paradoxical and 
contradictory ways of thinking through the rationalized, industrialized and systematically 
‘managed’ violence perpetrated in the Nazi genocide. 
Plath’s poetry has certainly a direct intellectual point of reference in Freud’s 
psychoanalysis. The point of Freud’s psychoanalysis is to validate the subjectivity of his 
patients and to prevent the repetition of harm, which results from desire or drive (Id) as well 
as authority (superego)-driven forms of homogeneity: where Id was, subjectivity shall be. I 
would argue that Plath’s poem performs such a break through its appalling and offensive 
offerings. There cannot be any doubt that ‘Daddy’ has offended if not outraged many readers 
from Joyce Carol Oates via Hugh Kenner and Marjorie Perl off to Helen Vendler and Seamus 
Heaney. In her defence of Plath’s poem Jacqueline Rose has argued that it ‘“addresses the 
production of fantasy as such”’.<xfn>20</xfn> Although potentially insightful, this is a rather 
general point. Where does this production of fantasy take place? Of course, the whole poem 
is a fantasy or fiction, but how precisely is it concerned with the mechanism of the production 
of fantasy? The speaker endows the father figure with a substantive power to represent gGod 
or the whole universe. This fantasy of the almighty father collapses at the point of its 
enunciation in the poem: 
Not God but a swastika 
So black no sky could squeak through.<xfn>21</xfn> 
The gGod-like figure of the father collapses into the brute force of Nazism. The poem 
performs this deflation of the inflated. In doing so it also breaks not only breaks with the 
myth of quasi-divine patriarchy but it also deflates and interrupts its own inflations in 
infantile babble. The poem swerves away from the voice that articulates its lines. It puts an 
end to the fantasies from which it has derived its oppressive, stifled and infantile existence. 
No wonder that Plath read ‘Daddy’ aloud to a friend ‘“in a mocking and comical voice that 
made both women fall about with laughter”’.<xfn>22</xfn> Its poetic voice is ridiculous. It 
cancels itself out to make room for something else. 
‘Daddy’ is not the only poem that enacts as well as witnesses the death of a self who 
has been confined to the stifling stasis of conformity and homogeneity. ‘Ariel’ opens in the 
oppressive darkness of stasis and at its close turns into the shape and speed of an arrow: 
And I 
Am the arrow, 
The dew that flies 
Suicidal, at one with the drive 
Into the red 
Eye, the cauldron of morning.<xfn>23</xfn> 
The image of the arrow denotes freedom from oppression. It validates subjectivity and frees it 
from being subservient to homogenizing forces. Does not the ending of ‘Ariel’ return to the 
homogenous darkness with which it opens (‘Stasis in darkness’)? It closes with ‘morning’. 
We associate morning with light. The spelling and the pronunciation of the word, however, 
also evokes ‘mourning’. Furthermore, the image of a cauldron may give rise to an association 
with witches and other prejudicial representation which that mark women as dangerous. 
These possible dark images and evocations, which return the ending of the poem to its 
beginning, are nevertheless put to rest by the promise of endless transformations in which we 
move from suicide to a new beginning, a new morning. Ariel’s arrow-flight is suicidal, but 
this is a suicide of an angle that is capable of re-birth, of unceasing metamorphoses of 
subjectivity. 
 As we will see, throughout her writing Plath takes issue with conformity and 
homogeneity. In Steiner’s words, her poems are ‘“unique in their implacable, harsh 
brilliance”’.<xfn>24</xfn> She sets out to develop a tough style of poetry that does not 
conform and please but one which that appals (as is clearly the case with ‘Daddy’). Her 
struggle with homogeneity is feminist. The arrow into which the speaker of ‘Ariel’ 
transforms has an inter-textual intertextual point of reference in Plath’s The Bell Jar. This 
reference illuminates the context of patriarchal homogeneity and societal stasis from which 
the persona of the poem breaks free. Apropos established gender relations Esther Greenwood 
rejects the lack of subjectivity that goes with the traditional role of women as self-less selfless 
servants who sacrifice their subjectivity for the life of their male companions: ‘“The last thing 
I wanted was infinite security and to be the place an arrow shoots off from. I wanted change 
and excitement to shoot of in all directions myself, like the coloured arrows from a Fourth of 
July Rocket.”’<xfn>25</xfn>Rather than being the place from where an arrow shoots of from, 
Plath’s persona wants to turn, in Ariel like Ariel-like fashion, into the arrow itself. The place 
that is a launch pad for an arrow is passive and static, recalling the opening of ‘Ariel’: ‘Stasis 
in darkness’. In Plath’s poetry, stasis is a state of mind imposed upon individuality: it is a 
straight jacket, a form of imprisonment. Movement concerns the free space granted to 
subjectivity. 
This implies that the subjective cannot be separated from what may sometimes stifle 
and oppress it: the stasis or darkness into which it may find itself placed as in the opening and 
closing of ‘Ariel’. Those of Plath’s poems that are not about the self are often concerned with 
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the social and economic pressures to hide or to be deceptive through misleading 
representations which that veil aspects of our lives deemed unacceptable. As Steiner has put 
it, ‘“Sylvia Plath had mastered her essential theme, the situation and emotive around which 
she was henceforth to build much of her verse: the infirm or rent body, and the imperfect, 
painful resurrection of the psyche, pulled back, unwilling, to the hypocrisies of 
health.”’<xfn>26</xfn> Plath’s poetry cries foul of the normative and acceptable. Her poems 
open up what society represses. They render glaringly visible what has been confined to 
darkness. Plath’s poetry creates a new public space where what has been drowned in darkness 
and stifled by stasis shoots off like an arrow. In one of her earlier poems, ‘Tale of a Tub’ 
(1956), Plath focuses on the ways in which we lie and deceive others as well as ourselves 
about ourselves in order to conform to the roles we have to display day in and day out. 
Instead of acknowledging the stark nakedness of what is our subjective substance, we acclaim 
the fabrications of representations that cover us like clothes in our social actions and 
interactions, which turn out to be role acting: 
Yet always the ridiculous nude flanks urge 
the fabrication of some cloth to cover 
such starkness; accuracy must not stalk at large: 
each day demands we create our whole world over, 
disguising the constant horror in a coat 
of many-colored fictions, we mask our past 
in the green of eden, pretend future’s shining fruit 
can sprout from the navel of this present waste.<xfn>27</xfn> 
Our embodied self is demarcated by ‘nude flanks’ which that we have to cover with 
fabrications, with clothes. Plath’s ‘Tale of a Tub’ does not reduce the truth of the self to the 
materiality of ‘“nude flanks”’ but its intensity derives from the pressure to hide aspects of 
one’s sheer existence. An enjambment emphasiszes the verb ‘“urge”’ and the urging in 
question then falls on the verb ‘“cover”’, which closes the following line until we face the 
alliterating and rather grave statement: ‘“such starkness; accuracy must not stalk at large’”. 
The hiatus (marked by the colon) between starkness and accuracy establishes a parallelism 
between two different semantic fields: between the harsh rigidity of starkness and the 
truthfulness of accuracy. What is harsh, unpleasant is nevertheless true or accurate. And yet 
this harsh, ugly truth must not enter public consciousness: it must not stalk at large. 
We have to hide or to repress— – Plath was an avid reader of Freud and thought 
about entering a Ph.D. program in psychology— – aspects of our lives that are rigid or 
otherwise unpleasant. Strikingly, the point of and for offense is here is not some inner 
subjective issue— – or an embodied form of a mental issue such as a tic— – but the sheer 
rigidity of the body’s demarcation (nude flanks). We all share such nude flanks in different 
but related ways. SoHence, the nude flanks denote the point where subjectivity turns 
substantive in at least two ways: (1) as the material form of our subjectivity (i.e. our body) 
and (2) as the shared constitution of life which that is the substantive or objective fact of our 
existence (the conditiohumana). 
What Plath’s ‘Tale of a Tub’ uncovers is the cultural, social, economic or political 
conformity that is imposed on the appearance of the merely material so that the materiality of 
our embodied life is itself not something natural but a fabrication. While being ostensibly 
concerned with the subjective— – the nude flanks that pertain to the poetic voice and on 
whose starkness the poetic voice reflects enjoying a bath— – ‘Tale of a Tub’ has a public 
dimension. A two stagedtwo-staged covering takes place. First the poem masterly downplays 
the public dimension of this so private bath by calling itself not ‘“Tale of the Tub’” but 
rather, more partially, more subjectively, ‘Tale of a Tub’. Then there is of course the 
uncovering of the public coverings and deceptions for which the privacy of the bath becomes 
the privileged place of inquiry. The title ‘Tale of a Tub’ also establishes an intertextual 
reference to Swifts Swift’s 1704 satire on society and religion entitled A Tale of a Tub. 
Whereas the content of Plath’s poem includes the taking of a bath, Swift explicitly plays with 
the non-literal meaning of his title. He makes clear that the title of his satire describes not 
what it ostensibly denotes (a tub or bath) but the condition of the society it satirizes: 
And to render all complete I have, with much thought and application of mind, so 
ordered that the chief title prefixed to it (I mean under which I shall design it shall pass 
in the common conversations of court and town) is modelled exactly after the manner 
peculiar to our society. I confess to have been somewhat liberal in the business of titles, 
having observed the humour of multiplying them to bear great vogue among certain 
writers whom I exceedingly reverence.<xfn>28</xfn> 
Plath does not choose and use the title of her poem in Swift’s liberal manner but her concern 
is social and public too. There is also a satirical component to ‘Tale of a Tub’: it ridicules the 
pretensions of various social performances and the deception of our public roles. 
The social focus of the subjective is a topic which that the social sciences— – at the 
time at which Plath was writing ‘Tale of a Tub— – were in the process of discovering. 
Commenting on Mary Douglas’s groundbreaking analysis (in the late fifties and early sixties 
of the last century) of the convergence between seemingly subjective parts and practices and 
the normative dimension of the socio-political, Judith Butler analyses the public codification 
of the individual’s body: ‘“Her (i.e. Mary Douglas’s) analysis suggests that what constitutes 
the limit of the body is never merely material, but that the surface, the skin, is systematically 
signified by taboos and anticipated transgressions; indeed the boundaries of the body become, 
within her analysis, the limits of the social per se.’”<xfn>29</xfn> She goes on to say that 
analysis shaped by the poststructuralism post-structuralism of Foucault and Derrida attempts 
to unseat the hegemony which that shapes the societal structure Douglas investigates: ‘“A 
poststructuralist appropriation of her (i.e. Douglas’s) view might well understand the 
boundaries of the body as the limits of the socially hegemonic.’”<xfn>30</xfn> As we have 
seen, Plath’s ‘“Tale of a Tub’” goes further: it delineates how the body (the ‘nude flanks’ of 
the body) is itself taboo. Hegemony cannot brook the harsh and stark differences between our 
bodies (as well as minds) and demands that they are be hidden, masked and covered through 
fabrications. In contrast to Butler’s poststructuralist post-structuralist approach, Plath insists 
on the unbending, rigid kernel of subjectivity that will not budge. The nude flanks remain 
there and they cannot be wished away through the streamlining process of homogeneity; they 
can only be covered with homogeneous fabrications. 
Refining and revising her poetic voice, throughout her literary life, Plath keeps 
uncovering the raw starkness of the idiosyncrasy that marks each of our lives in different but 
related ways. Throughout her writings, Plath attempts to uncover the universal truth of the 
idiosyncratic, the subjective, the excluded, the clothed over and covered harshness of 
selfhood: ‘“to wrestle through slick shellacked façades to the real shapes and smells and 
meanings behind the masks’.”<xfn>31</xfn> Poetry makes us see the public truth which that 
the public hides. Plath’s word for the public is ‘façades’. The façades which that constitute 
the architecture of the public are shellacked. In American slang the word ‘shellacked’ means 
intoxicated, ‘plastered’. Intoxication reigns in the public sphere. Poetry’s sobriety contrasts 
with the intoxicated deception of socio-political conformity. The romantic German poet 
Hölderlin employs the term ‘“the holy sober”’ in order to describe the elevated truth of 
poetry. This is not to say that Plath read Hölderlin or that her poetry bears similarity to his. It 
is to make you aware of the sombre and coldly calculated fabric of Plath’s sometimes 
seemingly emotive and subjective poetry. 
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Plath’s poetry is sober also in with respect to its reflective background. Plath was 
determined to find her individual voice in a tough and truthful harshness that goes beyond 
and sometimes offends conventional niceties. This is more than just the ambition to become 
America’s greatest female poet as she famously puts in her Journals: ‘“I have the joyous 
feeling of leashed power— – as I am not all now, though I sit on poems richer than 
Andrienne Cecil Rich.’”<xfn>32</xfn> This ambition has perhaps less to do with outward 
recognition than with the reflective desire to create a new style of writing, a new style that 
cannot be reduced to anything else past or present in its tough truthfulness. The frenzy of 
Plath’s writing goes hand in hand with her calculated aims and objectives as she makes clear 
in her Journals: 
I was taken by a frenzy a week ago Thursday, my first real day of vacation, and the 
frenzy continued ever since: writing and writing: I wrote eight poems in the last eight 
days, long poems, lyrical poems, and thunderous poems: poems breaking open my real 
experience of life in the last five years: life which has been shut up, untouchable, in a 
rococo crystal cage, not to be touched (Friday afternoon: March 28, 
1957).<xfn>33</xfn> 
What is that which is not to be touched? It is what society has put under taboo. Taboo 
concerns that which is dangerous, which is untouchable for certain groups of people, 
especially women.<xfn>34</xfn> Taboo denotes what society perceives to be dangerous and 
which it puts out of reach, hides and covers. In the quote above, Plath locates her poetry on 
the side of precisely that which is untouchable, outcast, dangerous, tabooed. 
Could it be that those entities which that have become untouchable are not only 
certain facets of life but that they ground life in its entirety? What precisely puts life under 
taboo? In my reading of Plath’s poetry we encounter received forms of not only ethics but 
also of aesthetics as instruments of oppression. Plath focuses on aesthetics: ‘“on the rococo 
crystal cage’.” The term ‘Rrococo’ designates the ornamental style of the late baroque, which 
emphasizes normative propriety and social niceties. (Goethe attempted to overcome such a 
style as part of his early poetic development in an attempt to capture a poetry that is true to 
lived experience rather than to social rules). Plath does not have the period (late baroque) in 
mind but the word ‘rococo’ denotes for her homogenous poetry, a poetry that is not 
subjectively sober and sombre but one that attempts to live up to the standardized pleasantries 
‘good society’ expects of us. 
Plath’s usage of the term ‘neatness’ is another word for poetry, not of truth but of 
social conformity. She thus abrades herself for being ‘“fixed, fixated on neatness’” (July 19, 
1957).<xfn>35</xfn> The fixity of social and stylistic conformity contrasts with breaking 
open into life’s true and idiosyncratic experience of the quote above. Fixed and fixated does 
not refer to being closed in on oneself but to being put into a preformed social cage of rococo 
aesthetics and ethics: as denoted by the word ‘“neatness’”. To break out of such a societal 
cage, Plath radicalizes her subjectivity. She goes on a quest to find her distinctive voice: 
‘“But to make my own voice, my own vision, that’s another matter: do I 
must.’”<xfn>36</xfn> From the early fifties 1950s onwards, the quest for an inner self is has 
always already had a universal undertaking, which includes different and often marginalized 
identities. This inclusion of the socially excluded takes place while reading literature and 
poetry. The early Plath admonishes herself: ‘“Read widely of others experiences in thought 
and action— – stretch to others even though it hurts and strains and would be more 
comfortable to snuggle back in the comforting cotton-wool of blissful 
ignorance!’”<xfn>37</xfn> Whether the reading or the writing of poetry, literature combines 
one’s own subjectivity with the multiplicity of selfhood that forms the universal substantiality 
of what is humanity. From early on Plath’s self has been premised on literature’s inclusion of 
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so many selfhoods. Plath’s appetite for different lives seems to be enormous: ‘“I can never 
read all the books I want; I can never be all the people I want and live all the lives I 
want.’”<xfn>38</xfn> The self here emerges not as a single but as potentially a universal 
entity.<xfn>39</xfn> The covering of selfhood implies the exclusion of so many selves. What 
demands such exclusion is the ‘“one size fits all’” approach that reigns not only in the social 
conformity of rococo aesthetics, but also in various political, medical, economic and, for 
Plath most significantly, gender policies. 
There is in fact a parallelism between Plath’s search for a non-conventional style and 
her revulsion with established norms about womanhood. Gender norms were still 
unquestioned in the early fifties of the last century1950s. In her journal entry of 29 March 
29th,  1950, Plath reports and vehemently rejects such norms: 
Perry said today that his mother said ‘“Girls look for infinite security; boys look for a 
mate. Both look for different things.’” I am at odds. I dislike being a girl, because as 
such I must come to realize that I cannot be a man. In other words, I must pour my 
energies through the direction and force of my mate. My only free act is choosing or 
refusing that mate. And yet, it is as I feared: I am becoming adjusted and accustomed to 
that idea.<xfn>40</xfn> 
This quote brings to the fore how deeply conceptions of selfhood contend with as well as 
succumb to preordained gender roles in Plath’s writing and thinking. As a girl, she has been 
relegated to a passive role through society’s ethical norm system. Were she not to play the 
role of the passive female which who merely follows the male lead, she would become 
ethically suspect. The only active role she is allowed to initiate is that of judging who the man 
is whose actions she will merely reiterate. 
Formatted: Not Superscript/ Subscript
There is a sense of inevitability. Whether she likes it or not, she cannot vacate the 
ethical sign system of society and step out of her prescribed passive role of girl and woman: 
‘“And yet it is as I feared: I am becoming adjusted and accustomed to’” the idea of what 
societal ethics expects of a girl or a woman. Against this background of inevitability within 
society at large, poetry emerges as free space that is not subject to societal rules and 
regulations delineating the conduct of gendered selfhood. It is a space which you could figure 
either beyond or below the straight line of social homogeneity. Here selfhood can flourish in 
idiosyncratic ways, in ways that would be precluded within the homogenous fabric of the 
socio-political. The act of stepping out of the socio-political is, however, itself a public one. 
Its publicity may manifest itself in so calledso-called scandals. Conduct which that deviates 
from a given norm or gendered role occasions scandal. Plath’s poetry is more radical than 
being merely scandalous: it not only offends against the norms and roles of society but calls 
into question their very ground of existence. A turning of table takes place: poetry becomes 
the measure of truth and reality; and under this heuristic gaze society’s flat or homogenous 
operations come to light in their fabricated fictitiousness. 
The many coloured fictions are those where we try to cover or to hide our specific 
subjective experiences in order to fit into one of the prearranged pigmentations of 
governmental rationality. Plath takes issue with conformity and unmasks conformity as 
deception, as cover of a disturbing truth which that may be ugly or beautiful or both at once. 
In the long poem Three Women (1962) the second voice articulates her revulsion with 
conformity in society, politics, economics and gender relations. Those who rule and govern, 
impose the homogeneity of their flat faces on us: 
And then there were other faces. The faces of nations, 
Governments, parliaments, societies, 
The faceless faces of important men. 
It is these faces I mind: 
They are so jealous of anything that is not flat! They are jealous gods 
That would have the whole world flat because they are. 
I see the Father conversing with the Son. 
Such flatness cannot be holy 
‘Let us make a heaven,’ they say. 
Let us flatten and launder the grossness from these souls.’<xfn>41</xfn> 
There is a certain continuity between ‘Tale of a Tub’ and Three Women. The latter belongs to 
Plath’s later poems. Here the focus has shifted from the outwards (the ‘nude flanks’) to the 
inner, to the psychology of power and subjection with which we are already familiar from the 
discussion of some of the entries in Plath’s Journals. The oxymoron ‘“faceless faces’” 
describes homogeneity’s constitution: it cannot endure the presence of subjectivity, of a 
distinctiveness which the term ‘face’ describes— – hence its face is faceless. The lines 
establish a tension between the idea of the sacred or holy and the reality of political theology 
and economy that is oppressive. 
The oppression of this theological, political, societal and economic power is the 
flatness into which it forces everyone and everything. Homogeneity is flat. It is a flatness that 
pertains to the whole of society, including religion. The poetic voice articulates its 
consternation about the all encompassingall-encompassing force of society’s homogeneity. 
How can even religion be flat? The word ‘“holy’” marks something that stands out (in 
Hebrew quodesh), that is dangerous, not-to be-touched, that is tabooed. The holy cannot be 
flat: ‘“Such flatness cannot be holy.’” The oxymoron of holy flatness pertains to the 
conformity of traditional Christian theology, centred as it is on the Trinity and the interaction 
between fFather and sSon. This interaction is flat and therefore cannot be holy. Plath takes 
issue with a religion and theology which that does not endow the world with difference, with 
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holiness. On the contrary the heaven created by the theology of Three Women is premised on 
plastering over difference. 
The violence of such theology that flattens everyone and everything into an image of 
its faceless face has ethical connotations. Ethics cleans society of conduct that is improper. 
Here ethics seems to justify the agreement between Father and Son to ‘“Let us flatten and 
launder the grossness from their souls.’” Similar to the nude flanks of the ‘Tale of a Tub’ 
grossness embodies that which stands out, which cannot be flattened, assimilated or 
accustomed to prearranged norms and roles. Grossness will not conform. Plath’s poetry is 
gross in this sense, in the sense of non-conformity nonconformity. 
As her Journals make clear Plath takes issue with the conformity of consumer society 
and sees it as threat to both poetry and life:  
“What do they want? Concern with a steady job that earns money, cars, good schools, 
TV, iceboxes and dishwashers and security First. With us these things are nice enough, 
but they are second. Yet we are scared. We do need money to eat and have a place to 
live and children, and writing may never and doesn’t give us enough. Society sticks its 
tongue out at us.’”<xfn>42</xfn> 
The quote from Three Women focuses on the theology of flatness. In this Journal entry Plath 
discusses economic pressures which that endanger writing and the survival of poets. Whereas 
homogeneity finds its endpoint in the repetition of the same or similar kind of products 
(dishwashers) and services (good schools), poetry is life, is the kernel of ever-different and 
ever-renewed life. Society with its established gender roles stifles, smothers, in short, flattens 
the life on which poetry feeds. The image of the mother, of a past where the child becomes 
trained to conduct herself properly, resembles that of the conforming pressures in society at 
large. 
Plath reflects upon the anger which that such threats to the writing of poetry provoke. 
She starts with her selfhood and then realizes that the self has to be rediscovered, has to be 
differentiated from the mother:  
“If you are angry at someone else, and repress it, you get depressed. Who am I angry at? 
Myself. No, not yourself. Who is it? It is my mother and all the mothers I have known 
who have wanted me to be what I have not felt like really being from my heart and at the 
society which seems to want us to be what we do not want to be from our hearts: I am 
angry at these people and images.”<xfn>43</xfn> 
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The pressure to live a conforming life as economically measured by money earned has its 
symbolic equivalent in the figure of the mother. What is crucial here is that this is a literary 
figure but not necessarily the autobiographical mother. The terms ‘mother’ and ‘father’ have 
entered another realm— – that of literature and its various constructions where we encounter 
a world that relates to but also utterly changes the way we think and interact with the social 
world. Literature counters the societal oppression of our distinctiveness, of what each of us in 
quite different and often contradictory ways could be. In Plath the word ‘mother’ evokes the 
smothering of societal demands, especially as they relate to gender. 
As has been intimated above, Plath attacks gender identities and roles as one of the 
most glaring and violent forms conformity has taken. She at once feels obligated to conform 
to the role as daughter, wife and mother and at the same time rebels against such conformity. 
Here poetry emerges as an alternative to the promises of social harmony and homogeneity. 
Her Journals frequently juxtapose the lively prospect of having babies and being a good 
mother and wife with the new life, the birth that occurs through the writing of poetry. Writing 
poetry is for Plath not only a life enhancing life-enhancing but more importantly a life 
generating life-generating activity which that is more fecund than the fecundity of conception 
and motherhood, precisely because it resides outside the reglementary structure of roles. In 
this way writing is the precondition for life. The mother acts as the conforming force which 
that not only stifles but also steals or expropriates the writing of Plath, who tries to commit 
suicide in her teens: 
How, by the way, does mother understand my committing suicide? As a result of my not 
writing, no doubt. I felt I couldn’t write because she would appropriate it. Is that all? I 
felt if I didn’t write nobody would accept me as human being. Writing, then, was a 
substitute for myself: if you don’t love me, love my writing & love me for my writing. It 
is also much more: a way of ordering and reordering the chaos of 
experience.<xfn>44</xfn> 
Writing preconditions life because it confers distinctiveness— – if not distinction— – which 
characterizes the interface between public and private. It is one way of connecting one’s 
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subjectivity to the public arena shared by humanity at large. Distinctiveness and distinction 
does not necessarily involve hierarchy. We are all distinctive in our different ways and one 
way may not be superior to another. In the quote above, Plath writes from the position of 
weakness: writing compensates for a lack, for a lack of social recognition and appreciation. It 
not so much puts the self front and centre but substitutes for selfhood via literary 
constructions. These literary constructions change social reality by creating a new world that 
is not flat but one that is truly holy in a non-theological sense. It is holy in its dedication to 
the ordinary, the messy, the gross, in short, poetry sanctifies the profane and elevates what 
has been labelled gross and impure in proper theological, economic, ethical and political 
discourse. 
Far from being theological or based on a set of creeds (doxa), poetry is nevertheless 
sacred and its conception and composition deserves a dedication which that is associated with 
the religious: 
Writing is a religious act: it is an ordering, a reforming, a relearning and reloving of 
people and the world as they are and as they might be. A shaping which does not pass 
away like a day of typing or a day of teaching. The writing lasts: it goes about its own in 
the world. People read it: react to it as to a person, a philosophy, a religion, a flower: 
they like it, or do not. It helps them, or it does not. It feels to intensify living: you give 
more, probe, ask look, learn and shape this: you get more: monsters, answers, color and 
form, knowledge.<xfn>45</xfn> 
The roots of the word ‘religion’ have two mutually exclusive meanings, signifying the act of 
both binding and unbinding.<xfn>46</xfn> Plath may be referring to the second connotation 
when she defines the religious act of poetry in term terms of ‘a reforming, a relearning and 
reloving of people and the world as they are and as they might be’. The pre-fix prefix ‘re-‘ 
highlight highlights the change poetry brings about. Plath underscores the significance of 
poetic change: it remains; it does not pass away as so much else which that partakes of 
societal work (teaching, typing, etc.). Poetry is different, it is not a copy or a vision of what 
exists but redoes our life and world. Poetry unbinds us from the flatness of societal existence 
and this form of unbinding is binding: it lasts, it does not pass away. Its endurance manifests 
itself in the different actions and reactions it occasions. According to Plath not just the 
writing but the long life of poetry is an activity which that marks our world, precisely because 
the flatness of this world is undone within it. 
Poetry unbinds us from societal or economic or theological or gender structures and 
the act of this unbinding binds us into a new public space of intensified, heightened life. Its 
religious dimension consists in the creation and also preservation of new forms of being. To 
be sure the life in question here is utterly unlike what we live when we conform to social 
roles and rules. Plath does not equate the act of physical conception with the composition of 
poetry. She juxtaposes the two in order to highlight the contrast between them. 
Babies are born into a world in which sooner or later they have to conform to gender 
roles and other structures through which the socio-cultural sign system conceptualizes their 
bodies and minds. The conception, by in contrast, that takes place in the birth of poetry opens 
up a new space in which we are free to vacate the homogeneity that shapes much of our 
socio-economic and political existence. This is the unbinding performed by poetry: it works 
through a reshaping of our accustomed societal role. Plath argues that the life of poetry runs 
counter to the economic imperatives which that reinforce the force of social conformity. 
Economics does so with the veiled but nevertheless clear threat of death: earn your money by 
conforming to social roles and rules or else you face hunger, homelessness and social death. 
Plath sees her life with Ted Hughes as an open scandal, as insult to such economic 
hegemony where making money is the only excuse for writing poetry: ‘“Images of society: 
the Writer and Poet is excusable only if he is Successful. Makes Money.’”<xfn>47</xfn> The 
problem is of course that it is quite difficult to make enough money with poetry. Plath and 
Hughes offend not only economic commands of conformity but they also disrupt the 
hegemony of gender roles: ‘“he isn’t earning “‘enough bread and butter”’ in any reliable way, 
I am not “‘sewing on buttons and darning socks”’ by the hearthside. He hasn’t even got us a 
hearth; I haven’t even sewed a button.’”<xfn>48</xfn> While Hughes does not fulfil the 
gender role of the husband— – earning money and providing for household necessities 
presided over by the wife— – he nevertheless expects Plath to conduct herself in accordance 
with the rules of a homogenous female identity. Plath’s Journals record fights ‘“about his 
deep-rooted conventional ideas of womanhood, like all the rest of men, wants them pregnant 
and in the kitchen’.”<xfn>49</xfn> The conventionality of Hughes’ ideas contrasts with the 
non-conventional, non-conforming nonconforming life of poetry which that reshapes the life 
of the couple— – making it insecure and intense. The life reshaped by poetry contrasts with 
the figure of the mother, which literarily embodies the longing for a security: financial 
security, societal security, the security of firm and clear gender roles, the security of clear 
targets and goals, the security of ‘final answers’: ‘“Her (i.e. the mother figure’s) information 
is based on a fear for security and all advice pushes toward the end and goal of security and 
final answers.’”<xfn>50</xfn> 
As we have seen, Plath’s poetry attempts to unbind us from such moral panic by 
revealing security and final answers as delusions and deceptions which that nevertheless 
shape our societal existence in its wish to find a safe home in a common lot. By denuding the 
deceptions that go with our public representation of ourselves, poetry overcomes the letter 
through which it works by performing a new —– radically subjective in the sense of 
nonconformist non-conformist— – form of life. In one her last poems, Plath celebrates the 
nascent life of poetry by closing her poem ‘Kindness’ with the following three lines: 
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The blood jet is poetry, 
There is no stopping it 
You hand me two children, two roses.<xfn>51</xfn> 
It is almost as though Plath were here conflating word and deed, world and poetic word, life 
and poetry’s letter. In the religious context of Biblical writing blood symbolizes life. The 
poem ‘Kindness’ closes with the connection between blood and life— – rather than the 
destruction of life, which could also be evoked here— – with the parallelism of ‘“two 
children, two roses’”. The roses point to the redness of blood. The two children appear within 
the context of poetry and not that of actually giving birth within the social setting of family or 
hospital. 
The blood jet alludes to the gushing forth of blood, which also accompanies 
conception. It is an allusion, however, that diverges from what it alludes to, because the 
reference point is not that of an emergent new child but that of poetry. The blood jet does not 
go with actual birth but with the continual birth and rejuvenation of poetry: ‘“The blood jet is 
poetry.’ ”‘“There is no stopping it’” harks back to the religious image of life without end, of a 
form of eternity that goes beyond mortality. The kindness of the title of the poem has, 
according to the OED, its etymology in the old English word for generation. In its early 
fifteenth- century usage, kindness referred to natural affection but also to natural right, a kind 
of birth rightbirthright. Plath investigated the etymology of the words with which she worked 
in her poetry. The very opening of the poem evokes an allegorical medieval personification 
of kindness as ‘“Dame Kindness’”. 
The allegory of this dame invokes and evokes a sphere of nature that is beyond social 
forms of deception into which we are born when we enter an already established already-
established system of signs, roles and regulations. This beyond is the non-theological 
religious dimension of poetry. It is religious in the sense of an unbinding that binds us to the 
new public of literature and poetry where we go without the various deceptions and 
homogenous roles which that language and society otherwise impose on us. The subjective 
and idiosyncratic kernel of our respective lives is the blood jet which that is poetry: it unbinds 
or liberates us from societal conformity. Poetry performs a redemption of sorts: it creates 
Paul’s messianic life, which, in Agamben’s intriguing interpretation, ‘“is the impossibility 
that life might coincide with a predetermined form’.”<xfn>52</xfn> Literature disrupts the 
identity between life and the homogeneity of a predetermined form which that supposedly fits 
all. Literature confounds this rationality in such a way that it makes it appear inadequate, 
Panzermann-like, subjective, desire-trenched, fantasy- driven, obscene. 
3. Kafka’s and Plath’s struggle with Augustine’s eternity and the 
inadequacy of traditional ethics 
Plath’s work at a poetry that is forthright in its raw starkness of heterogeneity has a point of 
support in Kafka’s rough parody of the substantive realms of law, order, economics and 
government. The representative picture of a judge within Kafka’s The Trial depicts not fair 
disinterest but impassioned fury:  
“The unusual thing about it was that this judge was not sitting in tranquil dignity but was 
pressing his left arm hard against the back and side of the chair and had his right arm 
completely free and just held the other arm of the chair with his hand as if his intention 
was to spring up at the next moment with a violent and perhaps outraged gesture to utter 
something decisive or even pronounce judgment.”<xfn>53</xfn> 
Ethics, justice and violence here become indistinct. We see the judge in action as a violent 
and highly biased man. The Law should, however, be un-biased unbiased. At the point where 
law and ethics attempt to punish non-conformity nonconformity, the ethical and the juridical 
turn violent. 
With reference to Kafka’s writing, Judith Butler has recently critiqued the violence of 
ethics: ‘“Condemnation becomes the way in which we establish the other as nonrecognizable 
or jettison some aspect of ourselves that we lodge in the other, whom we 
Formatted: Head1, Indent: Left:  0", First
line:  0"
Formatted: Line spacing:  Double
Formatted: Display Extract
Formatted: Line spacing:  Double
condemn.’”<xfn>54</xfn> The crucial point in Kafka and also in Plath’s literary critique of 
ethical violence is how in their writings societal norms, which we tend not to question 
otherwise, are represented in a way that turns representation against itself. Strikingly, The 
Trial represents the allegory of Justice as the contradiction of the just and the fair: as 
triumphalism, hunt and kill. K.’s incredible ‘Ah, now I recognize it’ follows upon the 
painter’s revelation that the figure represented in his painting is Justice. The recognition of 
what may be just in the representation of justice quickly reverses into its opposites. K. first 
seems to see symbols of impartiality and fair, non-violent judgment judgement: ‘here’s the 
bandage over the eyes and these are the scales.’ Immediately this image of patience and 
measure turns into one of fear-inducing movement: ‘But aren’t these wings on the ankles and 
isn’t this figure running?’ The painter replies that he is not allowed to paint as he likes but 
that he has to follow societal norms as they are dictated by the court of law’s strict 
commission. He has been commissioned to paint Justice in terms of Violence, Hunting and 
Victory: 
‘Yes,’ said the painter, ‘I was commissioned to paint it like that. Actually it is Justice 
and the goddess of Victory in one.’ ‘That’s hardly a good combination,’ said K with a 
smile. ‘Justice has to be motionless or the scales will waver and there’s no possibility of 
correct judgement.’ ‘I’m only following the instruction of the person who commissioned 
me,’ said the painter. ‘Yes, of course,’ said K., who had not wished to cause offence 
with his remark.<xfn>55</xfn> 
This indistinction between justice and victory points to the triumphalism prevalent in warfare. 
Indeed later on, we learn that the painting that purports to represent Justice depicts the 
opposite, namely the violent act of hunting: ‘“it was scarcely reminiscent of the goddess of 
Justice any more, nor of the goddess of Victory either; now it looked exactly like the goddess 
of the Hunt.’”<xfn>56</xfn> Hunting is an act of victimiszation which that ethics and the law 
are supposed to preclude or, in case it has already occurred, rectify. 
In The Trial the law hunts and victimiszes. One of the wardens who come to arrest K. 
says as much: ‘Our authorities, as far as I know them, and I know only the lowest grades, do 
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not go in search of guilt in the population but are, as it says in the law, drawn to guilt and 
must send us wardens out. That is law.’<xfn>57</xfn> In Kafka’s writing the law has 
abandoned any cultural or historical conditioning and has turned into a quasi-scientific force 
of nature. A pseudo-scientific law of attraction governs the working of the Llaw. 
This quasi-natural aspect of the legal system truly turns obscene. The obscenity of the 
Llaw reinforces the already- established sense of its extreme inadequacy and dark 
ridiculousness: the court of law ‘is composed almost exclusively of lechers’.<xfn>58</xfn> 
K. goes on to provide a striking example where yet again animalistic hunting constitutes legal 
procedure— – ‘Just let the examining magistrate see a woman in the distance and he’ll dive 
over the table and the defendant to get there in time to catch her.’<xfn>59</xfn> Different but 
similar to the self-parodying tone of Plath’s ‘Daddy’, representation turns against itself. The 
dive of the judge resembles that of a tiger rather than that of a professional lawyer. Or rather 
the professional lawyer appears as a rapacious tiger and the conflation of the two makes us 
feel ill at ease with societal systems such as the legal/ethical one. Here representation does 
not represent a copy of something but rather exposes the inadequacy of the thing it 
represents. The daddy of Plath’s poem deflates from being ‘God’ to the ‘brute force’ of a 
Panzermann. Representation turns against itself: it hollows out, exposes as obscene the 
represented. 
Plath was fascinated by Kafka’s writing, by how he commingles the familiar with the 
uncanny, the realistic with the symbolic. In a Journals entry of 15 July 15, 1957 she puts it as 
follows: ‘“like Kafka, simply told, symbolic, yet very realistic.’”<xfn>60</xfn> The yet is 
quite perceptive: there is indeed a clash between the symbolic and the realistic in Kafka’s 
writings. The reality which that Kaka’s Kafka’s short stories and novels describe calls into 
question, even into ridicule, what they purport to represent or to symbolize. Plath enacts a 
similar diremption between a symbol or concept and the reality described. She does so most Comment [SA10]: AU: Please check the use of 
the word. 
strikingly when she exposes the inadequacy of traditional ethics at the end of her late poem 
‘Burning the Letters’ (1962): 
The dogs are tearing a fox. This is what it is like— –  
A red burst and a cry 
That splits from its ripped bag and does not stop 
With the dead eye 
And the stuffed expression, but goes on 
Dyeing the air 
Telling the particles of the clouds, the leaves, the water 
What immortality is. That it is immortal.<xfn>61</xfn> 
In keeping with Plath’s reputation as a confessional poet, the poem has been read in terms of 
her marital breakup with Ted Hughes.<xfn>62</xfn> While Although it is beyond doubt that, 
at one level, the subject of the poem refers to the realistic and quite physical act of burning 
the letters of Hughes, there is quite clearly also another level which that comes to the fore in 
the lines quoted above. The comingling co-mingling of an animalistic image with a symbol or 
concept that has been foundational for the Western tradition of ethics: immortality. 
The closing lines of Plath’s ‘Burning of the Letters’ provide a stark contrast to the 
traditional conceptions of ethics, metaphysics and, associated with it, immortality. Within a 
traditional system of ethics, theology sustains the continuity of the just and the good by 
guaranteeing— – via belief in a benevolent and personal God— – the absence of eternal 
death. According to Paul, and following him, Augustine, there exists a dialectical relationship 
between change, trauma, death and sin. As we will see in the following chapter, modern as 
well as pre-modern medical discourse in different but related ways establishes a reciprocal 
connection between sin or unhealthy living and mortality. In Augustine’s and Paul’s pre-
modern context, death is a question of eternal death versus eternal life, and in modern 
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medicine it concerns the secular extension of life in a quasi-eternal domain: the biomedical 
promise of longevity which that denotes the absence, not of eternal death, but of its 
secularized version: the retreat of aging ageing and decay. 
Sander L. Gilman has recently used the term ‘“moral panic’” to describe the 
secularized reaction to ways of living (obesity, smoking and so forth) which that may cause 
premature death in our contemporary culture, which has been shaped by the biomedical 
prospect of an ever more ever-more extended longevity. Moral panic vis-à-vis disease and 
mortality evidences the link between medicine and culture (whether it is theological or 
secular; pre-modern or modern): any given illness ‘“is culturally, not scientifically, limited 
and its centrality in the mental universe of any given individual is heavily dependent on the 
role of anxiety associated with it’.”<xfn>63</xfn>The closing section of this chapter prepares 
for the following chapter by analyzing analysing how our secularized anxiety in the face of 
mortality refers back to a theological-ethical approach towards the absence of eternal death 
that characterizes the writings of Paul and Augustine. As Gilman has shown, in the pre-
modern context ‘“science is part of religion, as it is seen as means of understanding the 
complexity of human health and illness within a world view that does not separate the human 
from the divine’.”<xfn>64</xfn> In the wake of modernity science increasingly partakes of 
the immanent sphere of politics, economics and government. Whether it is theological and 
pre-modern, or whether it is secular and biomedical, our anxiety about disease and mortality 
gives rise to forms of moral panic through which we establish various delusions of ethics. 
The lines above from Plath’s poem attempt to unmask pre-modern as well as modern 
fantasies about the way out of eternal death: immortality or longevity. Paul proclaims the 
redemption from eternal death through the sacrifice of Jesus who absolves those who believe 
in him and follow his example (the Greek dogma derived from the Hebrew dugmah) from the 
sin incurred by the old Adam. So from Paul onwards, the finality of death results from the sin 
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incurred at the origin of sinfulness: what Augustine calls original sin. In Augustine death is a 
symptom of the corruption or the illness which that characterizes the earthly city of fallen 
humanity where we encounter ‘“the death in which God forsook the 
soul’.”<xfn>65</xfn>Here death has an ethical significance. It is an inevitable punishment for 
original sin: the whole of humanity is subject to the fall and thereby to disease and death. In 
this way everyone undergoes death but the question is whether death is momentary or 
momentous— – whether it is a brief interlude paving the way to eternal life in the city of God 
or whether it defines the eternity of life after death in terms of eternal death. 
The lines by Sylvia Plath make a strong case for the immortality not of life but of 
death. In Paul and Augustine— – and as we will see in our biomedical society of the twenty-
first century— – there is an alternative to death. In a world where death is not inevitable but 
avoidable, the fact that we all face the prospect of dying, functions as a moral warning. The 
warning may give rise to what Gilman has called the ‘“moral panic’” of contemporary 
medico-political policy. According to Augustine death and disease is are not something we 
need to panic or fret about. Augustine puts it as follows: 
We may therefore take it that this was the death God meant when he gave the warning 
‘On the day that you eat from that tree you will die by the death,’ this being tantamount 
to saying, ‘On the day that you forsake me in disobedience, I shall forsake you with 
justice.’ But even so, he certainly gave a warning in this death, of the other deaths also, 
which without doubt were destined to follow.<xfn>66</xfn> 
Death works as a warning in our contemporary biomedical society too. The warning may 
give rise to moral panic where we see death as the fruits of either theological or medico-
political sins of our life-style lifestyle. Pre-modern theology and modern biomedicine attempt 
to come to terms with the inevitability of our mortality in different but related ways: the 
former proclaims resurrection in the eternal life of the city of God for those who conduct their 
lives in the proper theological manner and the latter promises the ever-increasing deferral of 
the moment of death via the consumption of biomedical cures allied with what it considers a 
‘“healthy life-style’”. Both demand forms of obedience. 
Within a pre-modern context, humanity’s refusal to follow divine instruction 
constitutes sin. The fruit of sin is eternal death. Here clearly death works as part of an ethical 
system where a theological hierarchy prevails. It is a hierarchy which that informs 
Augustine’s politics. His politics divides the universe into either an earthly city— – 
represented by Cain’s murder of his brother Abel— – or that of God where we encounter 
immortality as the absence of death and blood shedbloodshed. 
The ending of Plath’s poem ‘“Burning the Letters’” (see the quote above), by in 
contrast, unmasks as delusion this ethical system which that differentiates between immortal 
life, and lack of virtue; grace and death; sin and just punishment. The ways in which Plath 
illuminates a conflict between the aesthetic and the ethic— – rather than a reconciliation 
between the two, as the critical consensus holds— – has  have not sufficiently been 
recognized. In this way Adam Kirsch has recently faulted poems such as ‘“Daddy’” or 
‘“Burning the Letters’” for allowing ‘“the ethical to intrude on the aesthetic.’”<xfn>67</xfn> 
Instead of letting the ethical intrude on aesthetics these poems disrupt our current 
understanding of ethics by hallowing out what they claim to represent. Plath describes 
immortality not as the blessing of more life but rather as the eternity of death. 
How can we come to see immortality not in terms of life but in terms of death? In 
order to address this question let me briefly engage more minutely with the lines quoted 
above from Plath’s poem ‘“Burning the Letters’”. At the beginning we encounter not the 
eternal but the momentary, which becomes momentous in a metaphysical and poetic sense. 
The transition from the momentary to the momentous re-enacts the pre-modern conception of 
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eternal death: mortality not as a stepping stone to eternal life but as constituting a lifeless 
form of eternity where eternity turns into nothingness. The poem depicts the moment of dying 
in an image— – that of a fox who is being torn to pieces by dogs: ‘“The dogs are tearing a 
fox.’” Plath’s usage of the gerund (‘“tearing’”) reinforces a sense of the instantaneous. The 
lines then, however, break from the momentary to the momentous with the phrase ‘“This is 
what it is like’”. The likeness bears full bloom in a metaphysics of sorts: a new metaphysics 
of immortality with which the poem closes: ‘“What immortality is. That it is immortal.’” The 
image of the kill ceases to remain singular and momentary. Through Plath’s evocation of 
likeness the physicality of the tearing to pieces turns metaphysical. It becomes a simile for a 
new type of immortality. The momentary transmogrifies into the momentous event of 
apocalypse. Plath’s poem disrupts and corrupts the traditional connotations of apocalypse: the 
apocalyptical is not final but eternal and its purpose is not, as theology has it, the redemption 
from the endless perpetuation of pain. 
Nevertheless, violence in the sense of tearing and disrobing appertains to the 
traditional usage of the word ‘apocalypse’. True to its Greek origins, the term ‘apocalypse’ 
denotes a denuding, an unclothing. In Augustine’s theological tradition apocalypse uncovers 
the revelation which that redeems us from death. Against the background of this tradition, 
Plath redefines apocalypse as a poetic uncovering of delusions. The delusions in question 
here are those of traditional ethics. This may sound odd. Ethics seems to be far removed from 
the action taking place here. The actors are animals. Ethics is, however, the privilege of those 
who are rational as opposed to animalistic— – or, in a theological context, those who have 
been created in God’s image of benevolence. Moreover, the action itself seems to have 
nothing to do with ethics: it is that of either a gratuitous or hunger-driven kill. 
The poetic voice indeed lingers on the violence of the act. The ‘“what it is like’” 
expression first unfolds as empathy with the victim. This is what it is like: put yourself into 
the place of the fox that is being torn to pieces. We are thus undergoing what Keats has called 
poetry’s negative capability— – its capacity to leave the self behind and live the life of 
others. The other in question here is quite alien to our sense of humanity: it is an animal, a 
fox. A fox that is violently taken apart and the poem enacts this taking apart by splintering 
into ‘“A red burst and cry’”. The fox has left behind the physicality— – or, may we say, the 
animal nature?— – of being a fox and has become a voice— – the voice of a cry. The distress 
that gives voice to the cry both accelerates and universaliszes its core of pain. It splits away 
from the ripped physicality of the lung and then unceasingly imparts its tone into the 
universe. The cry does not stop ‘“but goes on/dyeing the air.’” Here the gerund has 
transformed its syntactic function. No longer does it focus on an instant— – the kill of the 
‘“tearing’”. Instead, it describes the process of staining or colouring. A synchrony of colour 
and sound takes place: the cry carries the redness of blood and thereby translates a singular 
death into the universality of its environment. Given the emphasis placed here on acoustics, it 
is worth noting that the verb dye bears an acoustic resemblance to the verb die. The dyeing of 
the red spreads and perpetuates the act of dying of which it is the symptom. 
In rapid spasms of both metaphor and metamorphosis, the symptom of pain then 
morphs into the symbol of immortality. The rapidity of poetic movement performs the 
revolutionary upheaval that overturns both the metaphysics and ethics of a philosophical-
theological tradition which that Augustine has helped to inaugurate. The message of death 
and pain quasi-metaphysically informs us of immortality’s truth while forming the 
physicality of our universe: 
Telling the particles of the clouds, the leaves, the water 
What immortality is. That is immortality. 
The move from the physical (clouds, leaves, water and so forth) to the metaphysical is in 
keeping with a traditional methodology of ethics. A metaphysician does not need to be hostile 
to the physicality of particles. As Peter Brown has clearly shown, in contrast to the radical 
Platonism of Origen, Augustine— – as his career developed— – increasingly attempted to 
include the body’s physicality within his ethical and theological metaphysics:  
“The agenda that Augustine brought with him from Ambrose’s Milan changed subtly 
and irrevocably in his first decade as a bishop in the African Church. By 400, Augustine 
was no longer the convert who had broken, so suddenly and with such evident relief, 
from his need for a physical relationship with a woman.”<xfn>68</xfn> 
Instead of condemning the needs and longings of the body, Augustine appraises corporeal 
sacrifice through which the early Christians both lay claim to and witness the validity of 
Augustinian ethics. They forsake the mortal pleasure of body and mind for the immortality of 
the City of God. The resurrection into the City of God is corporeal. Augustine does not 
disapprove of the body. Instead he censures mortality. 
Death by martyrdom helps confirm belief in immortality. Hence, martyrdom tests 
ethics: ‘“For Augustine, martyrdom always represented the highest peak of human heroism. 
To have triumphed over the bitter fear of death was a far greater sign of God’s grace than to 
have triumphed over the sexual urge.’”<xfn>69</xfn> The sexual urge partakes of 
mortality— – indeed Freud would later conceptualize sexuality as death written small (as 
death drive)— – and we could say that for Augustine it is a symptom rather than the cause of 
transience. The bliss of Augustine’s heavenly city thus incorporates the notion of an 
incorruptible or immortal body:  
“The conclusion is that it is not necessary for the achievements of bliss to avoid every 
kind of body, but only bodies which are corruptible, burdensome, oppressive, and in a 
dying state; not such bodies as the goodness of God created for human beings, but 
bodies in the condition which the punishment for sin has forced upon 
them.”<xfn>70</xfn> 
The ending of Plath’s ‘“Burning of the letters’ Letters’” denies the goodness of God while 
evoking Augustine’s notion of immortality in an entirely different context. 
Here too immortality does not exclude the corporeal. Plath, however, turns upside 
down the dialectical relationships between corruptibility and mortality; between the 
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incorruptible and the immortal. Instead of testing and thereby proving the goodness of God, 
death and bloodshed unmask the inadequacy of traditional ethics. Traditional ethics has been 
built upon the axiom of God’s goodness.<xfn>71</xfn>As we have seen in our discussion of 
Augustine’s theology of an incorruptible body, Augustinian ethics establishes a causal 
relationship between goodness and immortality. While referring to the parameters of 
traditional Christianity Plath’s poem ‘“Burning the Letters’” corrupts and disrupts precisely 
such dialectics which that Paul and Augustine have established between the immortal and the 
non-deadly or non-violent. ‘“Burning the Letters’” depicts immortality in terms of the eternal 
perpetuation of violence and death. This suffusion of turbulence works not only works on a 
temporal axis. It  but also determines the nature of space and the cosmos at large. Here pain 
(the cry) floats oblong throughout the cosmos. Rather than God’s goodness, pain infuses the 
universe. The act of killing a fox questions what this violent act functions to represent in 
Plath’s poem. Representation turns against itself and exposes the hollowness of grand 
concepts which that may grow out of theology but still hold sway over our secular approach 
towards ethics. As we will see in the following chapter, works of literature (novels by E. L. 
Doctorow and Philip Roth) helps help us discover how scientific endeavours— – such as the 
medical quest for longevity— – are in actual fact mutations of economic and secularized 
theological paradigms. 
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